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ASSESSING AGOSTINI V. FELTON IN LIGHT OF

LEMON V. KURTZMAN: THE COMING OF AGE IN THE
DEBATE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
AND STATE AID
R. Craig Wood* & Michael C. Petko**

I. INTRODUCTION
The long litigious history of the Establishment Clause exposes the difficulty that various legislative bodies have had in
maintaining a consistent interpretation of neutrality toward
religion. The inability of courts to determine clear guidelines
for interpreting the relationship between Church and State
creates ambiguity in the various legislative attempts to benefit
religion through funding educational programs. Although some
cases appear to present clear guidelines, they actually fail to
1
provide comprehensible results. The result is an increase in
the tension of the twin clauses of the First Amendment of the
Constitution: "[C]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
2
thereof." The duality created by these two clauses reinforces
the principle that the government shall not use its legal powers
to coerce citizens into supporting the beliefs of one religion over
another, or to provide direct funding toward promoting any religion. This amendment also prohibits the creation of laws that
infringe upon an individual's right to practice religion accord3
ing to the dictates of his or her chosen faith.
* R. Craig Wood is the B.O. Smith Research Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership at the College of Education University of Florida.
** Michael C. Petko is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Educational Leadership at the College of Education at the University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I,§ 1.
3. However, the Supreme Court has even attempted to overcome this barrier
with the doctrine of public interest, or government interest for the public good. Bob
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This First Amendment struggle has led to complex court
decisions that are often difficult for local policy makers to follow. Thomas Jefferson originally proposed the concept of "separation of Church and State" in a letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association in Danbury, Connecticut, on January 1, 1802. The
Supreme Court's application of Jefferson's statement to the issue of funding educational programs within religiously affiliated educational institutions seemed to culminate in its deci4
sion in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
This paper traces the development in First Amendment
freedom of religion jurisprudence where it overlays education
issues. Part II will address the development of the Lemon test.
Part III will trace the shift in jurisprudence brought by Agostini. Part IV will analyze the novel approach of using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this area. Part V reviews the
effects of recent decisions and concludes with a discussion of
possible ramifications of the current jurisprudence.
II. LEMON V. KURTZMAN
Lemon v. Kurtzman centered on the constitutionality of a
statute in Pennsylvania, which provided financial support to
non-public elementary and secondary schools. The program
supplemented non-public teachers' salaries to the same levels
as those of public school teachers and reimbursed funds to the
private schools for textbooks and other instructional materials.
The statute provided that the salaries, textbooks, and materials had to be used for classes teaching strictly secular subjects.
The Court also considered the constitutionality of a similar
program in Rhode Island, which provided direct payments to
teachers in private schools who taught secular subjects.
Both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the basis that
they clearly transgressed the First Amendment's prohibition of
government "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-

Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983), provides the clearest example of
the Court's willingness to override individual religious belief if it were in violation of
public policy. See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986); O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345-46 (1987); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988).
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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volvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 5 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority opinion stated:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 6

Notwithstanding the influence of the separatists' doctrine,
the Court felt that total separation of Church and State was
not practical or warranted. The Court stated:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between
church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Fire inspections, building and
zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory
school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to ascertain that the exempt property was in fact being used for
religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement
must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a
"wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. 7

The Court further stressed that the holding in Lemon was
not to be construed into a strict "legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern." 8 Rather, the Court held that
each case should determine "the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." 9
In developing the Lemon test, the Court relied on Allen 10
and Walz 11 to undergird its view of Church and State relations.
In Allen, the Court allowed for the loaning of secular textbooks

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 612.
I d. (citations omitted).
Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
Id.
!d. at 614·15.
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Walz v. Tax Comm'rs, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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to students in parochial schools. The Court determined that
secular textbooks provided by the state were not instrumental
in the teaching of religion because secular and religious teachings were not that intertwined.l 2 It also cited Walz 13 to support
the third prong of the Lemon test. The Court opined that direct
aid or subsidy of religion by the government would create a potentially dangerous relationship with a harness of administrative enforcement that would burden both parties. 14
Lower court decisions employed the three-prong test and
ruled in favor of plaintiffs who alleged that a school district or
state school system was unconstitutionally involved in benefiting parochial schools. 15 However, other cases began to erode
the decision of Lemon. 16 The influence of the Lemon test, while
still substantial, has declined over time. 17
In Mueller v. Allen, 18 a Minnesota statute allowed parents
to deduct educational expenses, such as tuition, textbooks, and
transportation from state income taxes. Ten years earlier, in

Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 19 the courts found a similar deduction unconstitutional.
In Nyquist, the reimbursements were only for private school

12. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
13. See id. at 614-615.
14. In Lemon, Justice Burger quoted from Walz: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards." ld. at 621 quoting
Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
15. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Roemer v. Bd. of
Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1979); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 356-57, n.G (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Board of Educ. of Westside
Comm. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
17. Although Lemon did maintain a considerable influence upon the court for
many years, there were decisions that demonstrated the Court's propensity to adjust
its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. These cases have created an understanding that religious views must be accorded the same constitutional guarantee as
any other opinion. In effect, the Court was refining its position towards an understanding of the second half of the Establishment Clause, which deals with the government's charge not to create laws that inhibit free exercise of religion. Cases have been
brought in which the Court has ultimately permitted religious groups to use public
school and university facilities and to have access to student support funds for religious
publications. See Rosenberger v. Rectors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
18. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
19. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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parents while the Minnesota statute applied to all parents. The
Supreme Court found that the statute under examination in
Mueller did not primarily benefit religious institutions because
all parents could take advantage of the tax deductions. Furthermore, the Establishment Clause was not violated because
the law channeled assistance through the parents and not directly to the schools. Therefore, public funds became available
only through the choice of the individual parents. The Court
ruled, regarding the entanglement issue, that since the Minnesota program required a minimal amount of textbook monitoring, the program would not qualify as excessive. 20
The Court felt that "a religious organization's enjoyment of
merely incidental benefits does not violate the prohibition
against the primary advancement or establishment of religion."21 The Court also stated, "the provision of benefits to so
broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect."22 The Court's decision in Mueller created a fine line between benefit to institutions and benefit to individuals. Later
decisions, in Witters and Zobrest 23 strengthen that line leading
to a newer understanding of the Establishment Clause outside
of the Lemon test.
In Witters u. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind, 24 a vocational rehabilitation assistance program was
challenged because it had been used to support a visuallyimpaired student who, at the time he applied for public funds,
was attending a private religious college. The challenge
brought before the court alleged that the funding was unconstitutional. Following the rationale of similar cases, the Supreme
Court based its Establishment Clause question on the second
prong of the Lemon test. The Court found that the state had a
neutral policy of generally providing grants for qualified students to attend institutions of their choice, and had no influence on how students chose to use such grants. The Court
found such a neutral focus to be Constitutional although the
money ultimately flowed to a sectarian college, it was through

20.
21.
22.
23.
brest v.
24.

Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
Sec Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1973).
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)).
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); ZoCatalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
!d.
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the student and for tha:t student's benefit. 25 The Court later
stated in Agostini that such neutral programs as IDEA and Title I did not advance religion by relieving sectarian institutions
of any cost they would otherwise have. It further opined that
these programs provided services that were not part of the programs of the religiously affiliated schools and were not providing an incentive to attend such institutions or to provide any
support to these institutions. 26
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 27 parents
sued on behalf of their disabled child. The parents requested a
public school district to supply an interpreter for their deaf
child while she was attending a private school. The parents argued that the school district was financially responsible under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . The school
district argued that since the student would be in a private religious school, providing a public school interpreter would be in
violation of the Establishment Clause under Lemon. The Supreme Court ruled that providing a public school employee to a
disabled student in a private school would not violate the Establishment Clause. The evidence did not support the presumption that a public employee would inevitably inculcate religion.
The Court thus moved away from the three-prong test established in Lemon. Many of the Justices were not willing to
base their decisions in similar issues on one single test. 28 However, the Court was willing to apply criteria other than the
Lemon test in determining the separation between Church and
State.
The struggle to maintain neutrality is exacerbated by the
influences of those who feel that government money should be
available to all regardless of belief, of those who are strict separationists, and of varied court decisions. These influences also

25. ld. at 487-88.
26. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997). Although the Court had
found in Aguilar that the distribution of Title I services to students in the NYCSD violated the Establishment Clause as determined by Lemon, the NYCSD was not trying to
advance a religious institution but merely attempting to fulfill the mandate of Title I:
i.e., providing services to students from both private and public schools.
27. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391
(1983).
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arises from this volatile background.

29
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Agostini v. Felton

III. AGOSTINI V. FELTON
In Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court overturned two
31
earlier rulings: School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, which
addressed the constitutionality of a "Shared Time" program,
32
and Aguilar v. Felton, which addressed the disbursement of
Title I public services of the Elementary and Secondary Educa33
tion Act of 1965 ("ESEA") to parochial schools.
In Ball, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that
the First Amendment clearly proscribes both the federal and
the state government from "any active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Citing the decision of Everson v.
34
Board of Education, Justice Brennan declared that the state
and federal government should not pass laws that would aid
any religion. Further, they should not pass laws that would
provide tax revenue to support any religious institution. He
stated:
Providing for the education of school children is surely a
praiseworthy purpose. But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot
validate government aid to parochial schools when the aid has
the effect of promoting a single religion generally or when the
35
aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious.

This decision would regard any attempt to assist a religious or36
ganization by the government as unconstitutional. The Court
29. In Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court declared
that a New Jersey program that provided bus transportation for private school students was constitutional. However, in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty u.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Court declared unconstitutional a New York City
program that was designed to benefit nonpublic schools because the program had the
affect of aiding and advancing religion. Both programs had the affect of aiding those
who attended religious programs, but the Court decided the cases on different interpretations.
30. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
31. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
32. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
33. Id. at 403 (explaining Title I services).
34. 330 u.s. 1 (1947).
35. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 382.
36. Justice Brennan cited cases in the decision which demonstrated the Court's
concern that any relations between public teachers and private schools would endanger
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postulated in Ball and Aguilar that the possibility of inculcating a religious belief was highly probable if public school teachers were to work in private sectarian schools.
Aguilar v. Felton 37 addressed the New York City School
District's ("NYCSD") disbursement of Title I services. The
NYCSD sent public school teachers into parochial schools to
provide Title I services under the ESEA. The school district attempted to secularize the program in the private religiously affiliated schools by following strict guidelines. First, the city assigned teachers to religious schools on a voluntary basis.
Second, the school district supervised teachers with personnel
who visited each school once a month. These supervisors in
turn reported to another administrative level. Third, each
teacher was instructed to avoid involvement in religious activities and to bar religious materials from the classrooms. 38
Lastly, materials for Title I services were provided entirely by
the government. Despite these precautions, the Supreme Court
declared the program unconstitutional in light of the threeprong test established in Lemon. 39
In 1995 the NYCSD and parents of parochial school students brought suit in U.S. District Court to reverse the ruling
in Aguilar v. Felton under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). 40 When its requirements are met, this rule allows a
party to escape implementation of the final judgment. The
plaintiffs argued that recent decisions under the Establishment
Clause and comments by the majority in the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village

the public school employee's neutrality by causing the employee to somehow be pressured to inculcate religious doctrine into the curriculum. See Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, (1980); Meek, 421 U.S. at 370; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; Levitt v. Comm'r for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
37. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402.
38. The private schools were required to provide classrooms with no religious artifacts.
39. Justice Brennan wrote that "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot
be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs
and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These
prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between State
and Church." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 410 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
40. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1996).

1]
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School District u. Grumet 41 nullified or drastically changed the
decisions of Aguilar and Ball. The district court admitted that
Aguilar might no longer be valid but refused to overturn the
ruling against the NYCSD, noting that it lacked the jurisdiction to overturn Supreme Court precedent. 42 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari for review on appeal by the NYCSD. 43
IV. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(B)(5)
The use of Rule 60(b)(5) was a novel attempt by the petitioners in Agostini to obtain Supreme Court review of Aguilar.
This rule states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party, from a final judgment [or]
order for the following reasons: ... [or when] (5) it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."44 The Supreme Court recognized that Rule 60(b)(5) was
an appropriate motion when there had been a change in the
factual conditions or in the law.45
The petitioners had initially filed under Rule 60(b)(5), requesting that the District Court relieve the NYCSD from an
earlier ruling after Aguilar. The petitioners made this request
because there had been a change in the costs of administering
the Title I services and because Aguilar was no longer good
law. The District Court agreed with the petitioners that perhaps the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar should be
changed, but it did not grant relief because there were no clear
court cases that had specifically overturned Aguilar. However,
the District Court did acknowledge that the use of Rule 60(b)(5)
was justified in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
District Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Using Rule 60(b)(5), the petitioners made three basic argu-

41. 512 U.S. 748 (1994). In this ruling two concurring and three dissenting justices made various arguments indicating a desire to overturn Aguilar. See R. Craig
Wood & Luke M. Cornelius, Kiryas Joel II: The Continuing Controversy Of Church And
State Separation, 15 ED. LAW RPTR. 227 (1997).
42. The District Court's unpublished decision is cited in the record. This decision
was also upheld without comment by the Second Circuit in 1996. See Felton v. Secretary, 101 F. 3d 1394 (1996).
43. Agostini v. Felton, 519 U.S. 1086 (1997).
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (1996).
45. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992); Railway
Em pl. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1961); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976).
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ments to justify overturning Aguilar. First, they argued that
since Aguilar, the costs of compliance had increased so significantly that the factual situation was altered, warranting a
modification or injunction. Second, they argued that the majority opinion in Kiryas Joel concerning Aguilar constituted a
change in the law. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause rulings had undermined
Aguilar.
The Court's assessment of the petitioner's arguments resulted in the review of Aguilar, but the Court was not persuaded by two of the arguments proposed. First, the Court rejected the expense argument because the extra expense was
accounted for in the Aguilar decision and did not constitute a
change in factual situation under Rule 60(b). 46 Next, the Court
considered whether the various comments made regarding
Aguilar in the Kiryas Joel decision proved a change in the law
under Rule 60(b). The Kiryas Joel ruling dealt with the creation of a special school district in New York City to encompass
the inhabitants of an Orthodox Jewish sect. The school district
was created to allow the particular Jewish group to maintain
control of the Jewish children's education while receiving special education services needy students. The plaintiffs noted
that some of the Justices' comments in dicta indicated a willingness to reconsider Aguilar. Rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that the issue of Aguilar was not under consideration in Kiryas Joel, and nothing in the Kiryas Joel ruling related to Aguilar. 47
The majority opinion did agree with the petitioners' final
argument that subsequent Supreme Court rulings meant that
Aguilar was no longer good law. 48 The Court's decision to overturn Aguilar ultimately relied on two specific rulings: Witters u.
Washington Department of Services for Blind49 and Zobrest u.
Catalina Foothills School Dist. 50 Zobrest erased the perceived
symbolic union of Church and State created by the presence of
public school teachers in parochial schools. Since this issue had

46. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216.
47. Id. at 217. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had concurred in the judgment but
argued against Aguilar. Justices Thomas and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented and questioned the continued viability of Aguilar.
48. Id. at 218.
49. 474 u.s. 481 (1986).
50. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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been central to the rulings of Aguilar, Meek, and Ball, the Zobrest ruling implicitly overturned this aspect of the previous
cases. Hence, the Court ruled that Zobrest created new law in
holding that the presence of public employees in parochial
schools did not create a symbolic union of Church and State so
long as those public employees performed only secular functions.51
The Court cited Witters where it considered a state policy
that allowed a state to issue tuition grants to students attending a sectarian college to pursue a degree allowing them to become Christian pastors, missionaries, or youth directors. Since
the state had a neutral policy of granting funds to qualified
students to attend institutions of their choice and had no influence on how students chose to use such grants, the Court determined the program to be Constitutional even when moneys
ultimately flowed to a sectarian college. The rationale was that
the funds were for the benefit of the individual. 52
Finding that Witters and Zobrest had caused substantive
changes in the law, the Court determined that the original
Aguilar ruling was eligible for review under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court then turned to the
Lemon criteria to determine the appropriateness of the original
program of conducting Title I instruction within parochial
school classrooms. In applying the three-pronged Lemon test,
the Court found that Title I clearly had a secular purpose because it sought to benefit students who were educationally underprivileged. The Court found that Title I did not lead to governmental indoctrination, nor did it select particular students
based on religious affiliation. The primary effect of Title I was
to enhance a child's secular education, while neither advancing
nor inhibiting religion.
There remained the issue of excessive entanglement between Church and State, which had been an important feature
of the Aguilar decision because of the monitoring feature of the
NYCSD program. In Agostini, the Court determined that the
entanglement engendered by offering Title I programs in parochial schools was no greater than if those programs were offered in some other location. The Court determined that there
would be some need for cooperation between public and paro-

51. Id. at 224.
52. See id. at 225.
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chial schools regardless whether the instruction took place inside the parochial school or in a bus parked a few yards away. 53
The District Court case Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Secretary, 54 decided a year before Agostini, demonstrates the difficult nature of the NYCSD's ability to deliver Title I services according to the statute's requirement that the services be delivered to all eligible students
regardless of religious affiliation. The plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the alternative program implemented by the
NYCSD still resulted in excessive entanglement and symbolic
union of Church and State. Much of the record dealt with the
issue of how the Title I program in New York and other cities
should be financed. To remain in compliance with both the
Court's ruling in Aguilar and the mandate of Congress that all
Title I eligible children be served equally, regardless of which
school they attended, the U.S. Department of Education required districts to use "off the top" funding. 55 The cost of compliance, including the cost of leased sites and mobile instructional units, would initially be funded and then the per-student
allotment would be determined from the remainder of Title I
funds. The district court further noted that not only did the
Federal Department of Education mandate this funding approach, but that it had survived multiple legal challenges as
well. 56 Consequently, the requirements of Aguilar not only reduced funding available for direct Title I instruction to parochial school students, it also reduced the Title I funds available
to public school students.
Committee for Public Education also demonstrated the
magnitude of this diversion of Title I funds in New York City.
Exclusive of the actual instruction costs in the 1990-91 school
year, the New York City public schools paid $11,739,588 to
comply with the alternative plan designed in the wake of Aguilar. 57 While transporting children to nearby public schools was
an option, the extreme problems of overcrowding and lack of fa53. See id. at 228.
54. 942 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
55. ld. at 861-62.
56. ld. at 861; See Barnes v. Cavazos, 966 F.2d 1056 (6'" Cir. 1992); Board of
Educ. of City of Chicago v. Alexander, 983 F.2d 745 (7'" Cir. 1992).
57. See Committee for Pub. Educ, 942 F.Supp at 852. This spending breaks down
as follows: $280,402 for leased space, $225,711 for Computer Aided Instruction,
$106,934 for maintenance, insurance, and drivers for the MIU's, and $11,126,541 for
the lease of the MIU's. Id.

1]
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cilities in the NYCSD made this option increasingly difficult for
the district. Therefore, the NYCSD was forced to divert funds
from actual Title I instruction to auxiliary services in order to
provide private and parochial school children with these services in an acceptable manner. These costs were taken from the
initial Title I fund. This meant that there was less money for
both public and private school students since the balance had
to be split between the remaining students. Although it was
not a determinant in allowing for a rehearing under Rule 60(b),
the Court viewed the injunction against the NYCSD as punishing secular and public students alike. 58
The Supreme Court ruling in Agostini allowed public school
districts to provide Title I services or other mandated programs
such as IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) to
children in parochial schools. The ruling recognized the unique
circumstances in New York City and developed a policy that
allowed the public schools to provide a neutral, non-sectarian
benefit to all school children in an efficient and cost effective
manner for the district. The ruling also allowed similar districts the option to provide on-site Title I programs to private
and parochial students. Consequently, local policy makers can
make this decision based on local or individual criteria. Agostini allows public schools greater freedom to determine the appropriate manner and place in which to deliver mandatory programs to non-public school students. This ruling appears to
remove the constraints that bar providing similar on-site services to private and parochial school students.
Another fiscal concept is that Agostini may lead to the legalization of vouchers for parochial school students. Much has
been written regarding this issue.59 Most point to Justice
O'Connor's quote of the vocational funding of tuition grants in
Witters. Justice O'Connor clearly stated in Agostini that no infringement of the Establishment Clause would be created if the
state were to pay individual citizens who then pay private tuition. She stated that:
this transaction was no different from a State's issuing a pay-

58.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 212.
59. Peter Applebome, Parochial Schools Ruling Heartens Voucher Backers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B6; Daniel Wise, Parochial School Teaching May Be Paid by
Federal Funds, THE NEW YORK L.J., June 24, 1997. See also Arval A. Morris, Comment, Public Educational Services in Religious Schools: An Opening Wedge for Vouchers?, 122 ED. LAW RPTR. 545 (1998).

14

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2000

check to one of its employees, knowing that the employee
would donate part or all of the check to a religious institution.
In both situations, any money that ultimately went to religious institutions did so only as a result of the generally independent and private choices of individuals. 60

However, nothing in this decision would indicate such a result. In making its decision, the Court was careful to frame the
Title I program in terms of the child benefit theory. It made
analogies between the decision in Agostini and its rulings in direct child benefit cases like Board of Education of Central
School District No. 1 v. Allen61 and Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing. 62 By contrast, the Court sought
to demonstrate the difference between this case and cases
where it rejected direct support, either in financial terms or in
loans of personnel and material that could be used for religious
purposes or to defray regular instructional expenses of private
sectarian schools.63
V. CONCLUSION

The Agostini decision clearly stretched the boundaries of
judicial prerogative, although it was decided with the intent to
benefit children. In addition, the decision was made with financial considerations in mind. The uniqueness of this ruling
should not lead anyone to speculate beyond the legal and financial perspectives experienced by the NYCSD, and further
analysis needs to be predicated upon those unique features.
The Title I program addressed by Agostini provides educa-

60. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
61. Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a New York State statute which required school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to all children residing within the district, even
those attending sectarian private schools). The Court found the loan of secular textbooks to students fulfilling compulsory attendance requirements by attending a private
school was a religiously neutral benefit directly to the child and did not violate the Establishment Clause. ld.
62. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township., 330 U.S. 1 (194 7) (determining
that the use of public moneys to transport parochial students to school was a direct
benefit to children, by providing them with free and safe transportation to school, and
did not violate the Establishment Clause. An analogy was drawn in this case to using
public dollars to provide other services to such children, such as police and fire protection, while attending a sectarian school).
63. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 41:1 U.S. 825 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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tional services directly to parochial and private school children
which they would not otherwise receive from their non-public
schools. Such instruction does not relieve these schools from
any educational services they must already provide nor does it
provide any public moneys for these schools. Any indirect benefit to the sectarian school, such as improved student achievement, is incidental to the program and would occur regardless
of where the instruction occurred. This is a major distinction
from voucher programs and other schemes designed to provide
public funding to parochial schools or relieve them of regular
expenses such as equipment purchases and facilities maintenance.
The Supreme Court ruling in Agostini v. Felton is exceptional in that the court has directly overturned its own twelve
year-old precedent in Aguilar v. Felton. As noted by the dissent
in Agostini, the plaintiffs' successful use of Rule 60(b) to reverse the earlier ruling and stare decisis may well open the
Court to numerous requests to reconsider other precedents. 64
Therefore, it may be some time before the legal effects of this
ruling are fully apparent.
Equally important is that a careful reading of this ruling
shows no language to suggest that the Court is on the verge of
accepting voucher programs or any other direct subsidy of parochial education with public tax dollars. Indeed, the majority
in this case is careful to point out the distinction between the
direct provision of Title I services to children and previous
rulings prohibiting the provision of direct public support to religious schools. By arguing for this reversal based on the child
benefit theory, the Court has distanced Agostini from cases involving direct public aid to parochial institutions. This is not to
say that this Court or some future court may not someday
choose to accept a voucher program as Constitutional, but there
is no language in this ruling that either explicitly or implicitly
supports such a conclusion.
From a fiscal perspective, Agostini removes a great burden
from the New York public schools which, when complying with
the earlier Aguilar ruling, saw the annual diversion of millions
of dollars from direct Title I. This ruling imposes no new mandate or burden on public education. Rather, it merely provides
local educational policy makers greater flexibility in providing
64. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 254-58.
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mandatory programs for non-public school students. It is important to note that the major plaintiff in this case was the
Board of Education of the City of New York. The Court's verdict in Agostini v. Felton represents a victory for all public
school districts, especially those facing similar challenges.

